Welcome to hell of protectionism in 2009
What really scares economists about the present crisis? That despite spending more than 11 trillion dollars (including guarantees) by governments and central banks the crisis will spiral into global recession and deflation. One very effective way to trigger global recession is trade protectionism, when countries trying to protect their troubled industries impose import duty or non-tariff barriers on offshore producers. When one country does this then other countries follow with retaliation and trade collapses, more jobs are lost which leads to recession. We have seen this happening in 1930s.
See chart below (thanks go to David Wheelock from Fed St.Louis), which shows monthly value of imports in 75 countries between 1929 and 1933. Trade implosions happen, you have been warned.
Economic theory does suggest that large country can effectively raise tariffs at the expense of other countries, see Wikipedia link which probably explains why China, USA, India, Indonesia, Russia and many others may wish to flirt with protectionism. There is vast literature explaining that trade has positive effects on incomes and standards of living, see old paper by Frankel and Romer for example and the largest living example is China, which successfully pursued export led growth model and reduced the extreme poverty by hundreds of millions, the only large and meaningful step towards fulfilling Millennium Development Goals, other parts of the world failed badly to reduce poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa is the stark example, despite receiving large aid from the World Bank and other donors.
Economic theory, evidence and experience suggets that if world falls into protectionsm trap it will be very difficult to avoid global recession. Recent International Herald Tribune article presents evidence that many Asian countries launched policies to protect their producers from foreign competition, a quote:
“In the last two weeks, Chinese officials have announced a series of measures to help exporters. State banks are being directed to lend more to them, particularly to small and medium-sized exporters. Government research funds are being set up. In Hong Kong, the chief executive plans to seek legislative approval by late January for the government to guarantee banks’ issuance of $12.9 billion worth of letters of credit for exports.
Particularly noteworthy have been Beijing’s steps to help labor-intensive sectors like garment production — industries from which China had been trying to wean itself as part of a move to climb the ladder of economic development toward higher-wage, more-skilled activities. Now China has become much more reluctant to relinquish the bottom rungs of the ladder to countries with even lower wages, like Vietnam, Indonesia and Bangladesh.For instance, China has been restoring export tax rebates for the textile sector that it had been phasing out. Municipal governments have also stopped raising the minimum wage, which had doubled over the last two years in some cities, reaching a peak of $146 a month in Shenzhen. “China will resort to tariff and trade policies to facilitate export of labor-intensive and core technology-supported industries,” said Li Yizhong, the minister of industry and information technology, at a conference on Dec. 19.” [...]
“The third most populous country in Asia after China and India, Indonesia is already acting to limit imports of garments, electronics, shoes, toys and food — five large categories in which Indonesian producers are struggling to compete with China.Starting in the new year, importers of these products will have to be registered with the government, use only five designated ports for their shipments, arrange for a detailed inspection of goods before they are loaded on a ship or plane bound for Indonesia and then have every single container exhaustively inspected on arrival by Indonesia’s notoriously slow customs bureaucracy. The plan, designed to comply with WTO rules, was adopted after heavy lobbying by Indonesian manufacturers and labor unions.”
It does not look good. Welcome to hell of protectionism in 2009. Knock, knock. Who’s there? Recession.
Update
Another example of protectionism – trains manufacture – FT article


10 responses to "Welcome to hell of protectionism in 2009"
“What really scares economists about the present crisis? ”
Well, honest economists would be most scared that they didn’t see this coming, and that they ignored those who forsaw it, and who explained why.
Until Spetember 2008 consensus forecast for 2009 US growth was 1.4% positive, it turned to -2 negative within the last three months, after Lehman fell and monet and credit market stopped functioning. Nouriel ROubini was right in 2006, but there were very few people that were able to anticipate that shock will be ofsuch magnitude.
How about Paul Krugman? He warned about the housing bubble back in 2005 (I guess).
Dean Baker from the Center for Economic and Policy Research – he had been writing about the housing bubble since at least 2003!!!
I guess Andrea Boltho (back in 2003) had been warning about declining US savings rate and overconsumption in the US, which – in his opinion – pointed to another “wealth effect” induced by overvalued housing prices.
The late Andrew Glyn also warned about declining savings rate in the US during economic expansions (rather than recessions) – which might result in much more volatile consumption – and about the dangers of having a far too big financial sector in his book (published shortly before his death) “Capitalism Unleashed. Finance, Globalization and Welfare”.
I alse have a very interesting article (from 2003 as well) about the US economy under the title: “New boom or new bubble?” by US historian, Robert Brenner.
Joseph Stiglitz wrote in the early 90’s a paper in which ha warned that due to securitization banks would have reduced incentives to properly screen applicants for mortgages (hard not to agree with him right now).
OECD, in one of its reports (back in 2002), warned that the DEREGULATION of financial markets makes them more prone to asset bubbles and boom-and-bust cycles, while higher dependence of domestic consumption on asset prices means consumer demand will also be more volatile.
Poor performance of the US labor market during Bush’s presidency shuold have also alerted economists that the recovery after the 2001 recession was very, very weak (the economy was shedding jobs until summer 2003; then only 5 million new jobs created between 2003 – 2007; the US needs at least 150 000 new jobs every month).
The housing bubble in the US was the largest housing bubble in history – how could economist miss the $8 trillion housing bubble??!! Especially that the corpse of the internet bubble was still warm? Especially after what happened in Japan (housing bubble and stock market bubble collapsing in the early 90’s)?
It is all too convenient to hide behind the “Who could have known?” perspective.
But, as the already mentioned Dean Baker points out,
“If economists were held accountable in their job performance in the same way as administrative assistants or dishwashers, they would be fired.”
Dean Baker again:
Robert Shiller has an interesting discussion of how Alan Greenspan and almost the whole economics profession managed to overlook the $8 trillion housing bubble. Shiller attributed the failure in large part to “groupthink,” the fact that no one wants to be standing out from the consensus within the group. According to Shiller, this sort of social pressure forced many of those who had concerns about the dangers of a bubble to tone down their concerns or to just keep them to themselves.
While there is undoubtedly some truth to this assessment, it only presents part of the picture. Challenging the consensus by raising concerns about the housing bubble would have posed serious risks to the careers of those within institutions like the Fed or in the economics profession more generally. On the other hand, completely missing the largest housing bubble in the history of the world carries no consequences for those whose job it was to recognize such risks to the economy.
In other words, the problem is that the personal risks were entirely asymmetric. Raising concerns about the bubble could jeopardize one’s career, while ignoring the bubble carried no such risk. Under such circumstances, economists would expect that economists would opt to ignore the bubble.
The remedy that economists would recommend for other workers is to fire those who failed at their job. This would make the risks more symmetric. That way, in the future economists would have incentive to seriously consider arguments about financial bubbles and other dangers to the economy and not just unquestioningly accept the views of their bosses.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any economists in government, business, or academia will suffer any serious career consequences for failing to have done their job and warned of the bubble. Economists have enough political power so that they are not held accountable for their performance in the same way as dishwashers or custodians.
–Dean Baker
Pandora you are right, I read Stiglitz, Krugman, Baker, Roubini and may others but they all failed !!! Being right and saying later “I told you so” is a sign of weakness. I had the same experience when serving as deputy central bank governor, I saw things coming (opportunity for Poland to join eurozone at no cost in 2008) but I failed to convince others to take action. I failed.
So wehn I hear that someone was ritgh in predicting the crash, I respond that he or she failed badly, because did not do enough to stop it from happening. And you can do a lot these days (write articles, speak at CNN, CNBC, …., blog, or open a hedge fund and trade your ideas making billions, as some did shorting toxic assets in 2007 and 2008.
Well, establishing a hedge fund is no easy matter, even if you are a Nobel-winning economist. But they all (ROubini, Baker, Krugman) appeared on TV, they all wrote articles and papers. They did try to warn!
I think it was J.K. Galbraith who wrote that for the bubble to countine growing, people need some sort of “incantation”: this time it will be different, this time the business cycles have ended, this time the DOW will not collapse.
Well, here are two prime examples of such incantation:
http://www.amazon.com/Real-Estate-Boom-Will-Bust/dp/0385514352
(published in 2006!!!!)
and
http://www.amazon.com/Dow-36-000-Strategy-Profiting/dp/0609806998
I think the problem lies in some sort of noise/warnings ratio. The are always warnings but there are also those cheerleading as the bubble grows (”noise”). I guess during the tulipmania, there must have been some warnings as well.
But it would be useful if the central banks (and professional economists in general) started treating asset bubbles more seriosly – more Minsky, less “efficent market hypothesis”, I would say.
Luckily, the tide might be turning.
Alan Blinder conceded in the Financial Times that “recent events are sowing some seeds of doubt.”
The tide is turning big time, indeed. I hope we do not regret it in the future, as we mix good and bad regulation making the system even more incomprehensive.
Many of us were wondering where the heck all this money was coming from back in the late 1990s… I remember the 1990s reasoning-du-jour was the weapons-to-plowshares benefit derived from the end of the Cold War… little did we know that banks were using ever-increasing balance sheet leverage to essentially print money in the form of credit. Can’t violate the BIS-mandated 10x fractional lending limit? Form a SIV with 40x and 50x leverage… hedge funds with 20x leverage (provided by their prime brokers a.k.a. the banks), funds of funds with 3x and 5x leverage created by borrowing based on their investors’ capital (borrowed from… banks again)… Private equity goon squads pillaging perfectly healthy public firms into bankruptcy using money borrowed (in many cases, from banks)…
It doesn’t matter that the Treasury wasn’t running the printing presses, the governments had abdicated their role of minting money to the banks by allowing them to run such leverage and create the greatest and – more importantly – the most economically, geographically and socially pervasive credit bubble in history.
So, yes, some of us who were raised to believe that excessive and ever-increasing debt is a bad thing did see this coming long before the housing bubble pointed to the end-game of the multi-decade credit bubble that began in the 1980s. It’s called common sense, something that I’ve always complained is methodically burned from the minds of academics by too many years of navel-gazing.
This is why, in the old days, defaulting on your debt earned you jail time. Removing this penalty led to our predicament.
I could not agree more. Instead of creating sets of even more complicated rules and regulations that nobody understands we need to go back to basics. Liquid, easy to understand product, originators should bear some risk the create, and rules should be simple (jail rule was simple and effective indeed). One of best explanations of credit crunch I found was a recent book by Richard Bookstaber, he correctly states that we created this crisis demon ourselves. We need to learn risk management from the very best, and the very best is a cockroach. It ignores almost all signals, but responds to just one. When air blows from one directions it turns around and runs in the opposite direction – says Bookstaber. And cockroaches survived all possible disasters in good shape.
Brad DeLong has an interesting post on his blog regarding the subject:
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/01/raghuram-rajan-is-my-guru-now.html
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